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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
section 2705.01 which reads as follows: "A court, or judge at chambers,
may summarily punish a person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice."
The judge had issued an order that no photographs were to be taken in
the courtroom while court was in session. The photographer stood in
the hall outside the courtroom and took a picture of the court session
through a glass panel in the door. The court of appeals found that no
contempt had been committed in that the order given had not been
violated because the pictures were taken outside the courtroom. It was
held that there was no disturbance of the courtroom proceedings by the
photographer's action.
EDGAR I. KING
EVIDENCE
WHO PARKED THIS CAR?
It is 5:00 o'clock of a busy afternoon and there is a shiny new 1961
automobile parked at the curb, blocking completely one lane of pave-
ment, despite large and dear signs which forbid parking from 4 to 6 p. m.
Officer O'Tooligan, his eyes gleaming and his face yellow with choler,
writes out and affixes a traffic ticket for violation of the city's ordinances
regulating street parking.
A check of registration shows the offending vehicle to be owned by
Simeon Scofflaw. It is not the first such violation charged to automo-
biles registered to him. As in the previous cases he appears for trial and
pleads "not guilty." The officer who observed the violation testifies as to
the facts of it, but is unable to state who parked the car. Mr. Scofflaw
remains silent, upon advice of his counsel, who, at the dose of the prosecu-
tor's case moves for a finding of "not guilty." In all previous such cases
his ploy has succeeded, but this time things are not the same. This fair
city has, since the last case, amended its traffic code ordinance by adding
the following short paragraph thereto:
If any vehicle is found upon a street, highway, alley, park or other
public grounds of the city in violation of any provision of this chapter,
or any ordinance of this city, regarding the stopping or standing or
parking of vehicles, and the identity of the driver cannot be determined,
the owner, or person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall be
held prima facie responsible for such violation.'
On this basis the accused is found guilty, despite his contentions
(1) that this section constitutes a rule of evidence, which municipal
1. COLUMBUS, OHio, TRAFFIc CODE § 2151.06.
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corporations have no power to create, and (2) that the section is invalid
because it is in direct conflict with the defendant's presumption of in-
nocence.
The Ohio Supreme Court' unanimously upheld the ordinance, and
affirmed the court of appeals? A number of similar ordinances have
been enacted in other cities. Usually they have been sustained. In other
cases courts have ruled that even without such an ordinance proof of the
violation and ownership are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
guilt against the owner.4
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, chose to base its ruling upon a
holding that the ordinance "creates no rule of evidence."5  Nor does it
affect the defendant's presumption of innocence since it does not require
him to testify, nor does it deny him his right to make out his defense
or to testify.
The court referred to the peculiar nature of the problem of traffic
enforcement and made the analogy of state statutes which fix liability up-
on an owner for certain uses of his automobile by another.
FAILURE TO SWEAR JURORS ON VoiR DIRE
In 1957 the legislature amended section 2945.27 of the Revised
Code to require the examination of prospective jurors in criminal cases
under oath or upon affirmation.'
In a trial for aiding and abetting an embezzler, commenced more
than one year after the effective date of the amendment, the trial judge
conducted a voir dire examination and permitted both prosecuting attor-
ney and defense counsel to take part therein. No one mentioned the fact
that there had been no compliance with the new statute. The jury was
chosen and sworn in compliance with section 2945.28, whereupon open-
ing statements were made and a substantial portion of the State's case
presented before the omission was finally noticed. Defense counsel re-
fused formally to waive the requirement; the court refused to discharge
the jury without prejudice under the first three subsections of section
2945.36 and counsel for defendant refused consent to a discharge of the
jury under the fourth subsection. The trial then continued to a convic-
tion. The defendant appealed.
2. City of Columbus v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 164 N..2d 734 (1960). See also dis-
cussion in Criminal Law and Procedure section, p. 498 supra.
3. 159 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Cr. App. 1958).
4. Annot.,49A.LR.2d456,458 (1956).
5. City of Columbus v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 331, 164 N.E.2d 734, 737 (1960).
Wigmore would seem to disagree. He refers to it as a proper inference in a chain of two or
more, commening from a proven fact and ending in a finding as to guilt or liability. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 150(a) (1940). The cases in Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d 456 (1956) certainly
treat it as a matter of evidence.
6. 127 Ohio Laws 419, 420 (1957).
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The supreme court upheld the action of the trial court.' First, the
majority opinion relied on a well established rule that an appellate court
will not consider an error which a complaining party could have called
to the attention of the trial court in time to remedy, but failed to do so.
A defendant is not entitled to more than one fair trial. Second, the
court considered the rule that a judgment of conviction is not to be
reversed for error unless the accused was prejudiced by the error or was
prevented from having a fair trial. The court reviewed a number of
its prior decisions in which failure to abide by various statutory direc-
tions had been held not to have prejudiced the accused or to have pre-
vented a fair trial. It concluded that accused had not been denied a
fair trial in this respect.
Three judges vigorously dissented, stating that in their opinion the
legislature had clearly intended that no jury could be legally impaneled
without such an examination having been conducted under oath. In
other words, a jurisdictional defect was present. The dissenting majority
would have held that a discharge of the jury without prejudice to the
prosecution should have occurred at the point of discovery.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
By a sharply divided court, the principle that evidence obtained by
an unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution
was reaffirmed in State v. Mapp.8  First enunicated in State v. Lindway,9
the rule remains controversial.
Actually, had not there been a failure of a sufficient majority of the
court to agree upon the unconstitutionality of the section of the Code
under which accused was convicted, the case would have turned on that
point.
PRIVILEGE
Two-thirds of the states in this country have established the physician-
patient privilege. Ohio's statute,"0 while not unique, differs from the pro-
visions in many of the states recognizing the privilege, in that it allows
a waiver by the surviving spouse or executor or administrator of the
patient and by the patient himself testifying. On the other hand, if there
7. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N.E.2d 379 (1960). See also discussion in Crim-
inal Law and Procedure section, p. 496 supra.
8. 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387, prob. juris. noted, 364 U.S. 686 (1960). See also
discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 471 supra and in Criminal Law and Procedure
section, p. 488 supra.
9. 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936).
See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 471 supra.
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02.
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is to be a waiver by other means, the "express consent" of the patient
must be shown.
What constitutes "express consent"? There is a conflict on construc-
tion of the statute. Some courts hold for strict construction, others for
a liberal construction. Ohio has held' that merely answering questions
as to treatment from physicians in response to questions on cross-examina-
tion does not waive the privilege. Such testimony is not "voluntary"
within the purview of the statute.
In Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company' an insured
had died of a coronary occlusion. His surviving spouse made a claim for
payments on a policy issued on his life by defendant company and, at
that time, she executed before a notary an instrument addressed "to any
physician ... [by whom] the deceased named below has been treated
within three years," which instrument authorized the bearer "to make or
obtain a copy in whole or in part or an abstract of any records you may
have concerning the above named decedent" and "to submit such copy
or abstract directly to the.., life insurance company as part of the proof
of said claim."
The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County held that "an expressed
waiver" could "be implied from the conduct" of the plaintiff's personal
representative.
In Neff v. Hall3 a fee appraiser, hired by the Department of High-
ways to make an appraisal of the value of land taken in an appropri-
ation proceeding, refused to divulge his appraisal findings at a deposition
being taken by the landowner.
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County held the matter privileged,
for the reasons (1) that the Director of Highways occupies the position
of a defendant in any lawsuit, since he is defending his determination of
the value of the land taken, and (2) that the report had been turned over
to the Highway Department's counsel.
City of Dayton v. Smith'4 involved a civil action by plaintiff city for
damage to one of its police cruisers alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of defendant in colliding with it. The police officers who
were driving and occupying the cruiser had made a report of the acci-
dent. The nature of this report does not dearly appear from a reading
of the court's opinion, but it seems to have been assumed by the court of
appeals that it was of an ordinary and routine nature and that it was
not made with a view to litigation, nor for the use of the city's legal coun-
11. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.X.2d 776 (1937).
12. 168 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
13. 110 Ohio App. 519, 170 NX.E.2d 77 (1959).
14. 109 Ohio App. 383, 166 N.E.2d 256 (1959).
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